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10	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
11	FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
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13	CALIFORNIA-MEXICO STUDIES	Case No.: CV
14	CENTER, INC. (A California Non- Profit Agency): and MIRIAM	PETITION FOR WRIT OF
15	GUADALUPE DELGADO GOMEZ, NELLY XIMENA PULLUTASIG	MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND
16	LLUMITASI, GEOMARA ESTEPHANIA PULLUTASIG	INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
17	LLUMITASI, CARLOS EDUARDO CORNEJO QUEZADA, [name additional plaintiffs] (Individual)	
18	[name additional plaintiffs] (Individual) Applicants),	
19	Plaintiffs,	
20	vs.	
21	U.S. DEPARTMENT OF	
22	HOMELAND SECURITY ("DHS");	
23	("USCIS"); ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, SECRETARY OF	
24	DHS; TRACY RENAUD, DIRECTOR) OF USCIS; FELICIA ESCOBAR	
25	CARRILLO, CHIEF OF STAFF TO DIRECTOR,	
26	Defendants.	
27	Determants.	
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

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INTRODUCTION

- Plaintiffs California-Mexico Studies Center, Inc. ("CMSC"), and 1. MIRIAM GUADALUPE DELGADO GOMEZ, NELLY XIMENA PULLUTASIG LLUMITASI, GEOMARA ESTEPHANIA PULLUTASIG LLUMITASI, CARLOS EDUARDO CORNEJO QUEZADA, (Individual Applicants), hereby petition for a Writ of Mandamus. The Individual Applicants are recipients of deferred action under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA) who seek to compel Defendants Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), and U.S. Customs and Immigration Services ("USCIS") to promptly and expeditiously adjudicate applications for "advance parole" they filed in August and September 2020. Individual Applicants are students whose course of study requires them to study abroad beginning in May 2021. As deferred action recipients, Plaintiffs are required to secure advance parole—that is, pre-approval to re-enter the United States upon completing their study abroad—lest they be deemed inadmissible aliens, denied re-entry, and thereby separated from their homes and family in the United States. Despite multiple requests that Defendants adjudicate Plaintiffs' applications for advance parole, Defendants have failed to discharge their duty to do so, causing CMSC and the Individual Applicants to suffer extreme hardship and threatening them with irreparable injury.
- 2. In June 2012, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued a memorandum announcing an immigration relief program for certain young people who were brought to this country as children. Known as DACA, the program applies to childhood arrivals who were under age 31 in 2012; have continuously resided here since 2007; are current students, have completed high school, or are honorably discharged veterans; have not been convicted of any serious crimes; and do not threaten national security or public safety. DHS concluded that individuals who meet these criteria warrant favorable treatment under the immigration laws

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because they lacked the intent to violate the law, are productive contributors to our society, and know only this country as home.

- 3. To prevent such individuals from being removed from the United States, DHS directed Immigration and Customs Enforcement to exercise prosecutorial discretion to defer action to remove them for a period of two years, subject to renewal. In addition, DHS directed USCIS to accept applications to determine whether these individuals qualify for work authorization during this period of deferred action, as permitted under 8 CFR §274a.12(c)(14) (2012). Deferred action recipients are considered "lawfully present" in the United States, 8 CFR §1.3(a)(4)(vi); 42 CFR §417.422(h) (2012), and in addition to work authorization, are entitled to social security numbers, 8 C.F.R. § 1.3(a)(4)(vi), advance parole, id. § 212.5, and a limited class of public assistance, such as state and federal aid for medical emergencies, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611(b)(1), 1621(b)(1). Benefits like these allowed DACA recipients to work, travel abroad, access credit, and otherwise lead productive lives during their periods of deferred action
- In November 2014, DHS announced that it would expand DACA 4. eligibility by removing the age cap, shifting the date-of-entry requirement from 2007 to 2010, and extending the deferred action and work authorization period to three years.
- Plaintiff CMSC is a California non-profit agency whose mission is to 5. educate and advocate for recipients of deferred action under the DACA program. DACA recipients are young immigrants who were brought to the United States as children. Since 2012, the federal government has afforded DACA recipients protection from deportation and permission to work legally in the United States. CSMC conducts a program for DACA recipients to study abroad. The Individual Applicants are students in CSMC's DACA program.

- 6. Plaintiffs MIRIAM GUADALUPE DELGADO GOMEZ, NELLY XIMENA PULLUTASIG LLUMITASI, GEOMARA ESTEPHANIA PULLUTASIG LLUMITASI, CARLOS EDUARDO CORNEJO QUEZADA, are among 84 DACA recipients who submitted an application for advance parole to Defendant USCIS in or about August 2020, so that they may study abroad pursuant to CMSC's DACA program. (See Exhibit A)
- 7. Under the leadership of Professor Armando Vasquez-Ramos, the CMSC offers an educational/cultural program in which DACA recipients travel to Mexico and conduct studies pertaining to the relationship between Mexico and the United States, particularly in terms of national security, to conduct individual ethnographic family research, and to publish findings in a compendium of academic policy papers on migration, border security, economic and regional independence.
- 8. Moreover, the program will provide recipients with academic and field study exposure to cultural lifestyle, educational system, and social institutions of Mexico. (See Exhibit B, attachment to each individual application).
- 9. The Individual Applicants first applied to Defendant USCIS for advance parole in advance of the Winter 2020 program, slated to be held from December 15, 2020 to January 19, 2021, but they were forced to postpone their studies when USCIS failed to adjudicate their applications. The Individual Applicants thereafter notified USCIS they intended to study abroad from May 15, 2021 to July 31, 2021, and implored it to adjudicate their applications for advance parole on or before May 15, 2021.
- 10. Despite additional correspondence and communications with USCIS officials Defendant has failed to do so. (Ex. C, D)

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JURISDICTION

- 11. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this is a civil action arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Plaintiffs seeks relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 702, 706(1), and the Mandamus and Venue Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361. *See Khan v. Johnson*, 65 F. Supp. 3d 918, 925 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (holding the court had subject-matter jurisdiction to determine whether USCIS failed to fulfill its non-discretionary duty to process adjustment of status applications within a reasonable period of time under the APA); *see also Abdulmajid v. Arellano*, No. CV 08-796-GHK VBKx, 2008 WL 2625860, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2008) (finding subject-matter jurisdiction over delayed naturalization applications under both the APA and the Mandamus and Venue Act); *Soneji v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 525 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1154-1157 (N.D. Cal 2007) (finding subject-matter jurisdiction over delayed adjustment of status applications under both the APA and the Mandamus and Venue Act).
- 12. The APA provides individuals who have been injured by agency inaction with a means of seeking judicial review and it vests this Court with the power to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." 5 U.S.C. § 706(1); see also id. § 702 ("[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action . . . is entitled to judicial review thereof"); id. § 551(13) (defining "agency action" to include "failure to act").
- 13. The Mandamus and Venue Act provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
- 14. The Mandamus and Venue Act provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel

an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361.

VENUE

15. Venue is proper in the Central District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1), which states that:

A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity . . . [may] be brought in any judicial district in which . . . (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or . .

- . (C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action. 28 U.S.C. § 13911(e)(1).
- 16. This is a civil action against officers of the United States in their official capacities. Plaintiffs communicated and interacted with USCIS's offices in Washington D.C. regarding the 84 applications for advance parole. But Plaintiff CMSC and many of the Individual Applicants reside in this district. The DHS and USCIS have local offices in this district. As a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in this district and Plaintiff resides in this district, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1).

THE PARTIES

17. Plaintiff CMSC has its offices in the City of Long Beach, California, and as such, currently resides in Los Angeles County, California. Central to CMSC's mission is advocating for and educating DACA recipients. The DACA recipients CMSC educates are the functional equivalents of its members. The rights of DACA recipients the CMSC seeks to protect in this action are germane to its mission and purpose. CMSC has trained almost 200 DACA recipients through its study abroad program. Defendants' failure to adjudicate the Individual Applicants' eligibility for advance parole, as alleged herein, makes it substantially

- 18. Plaintiffs MIRIAM GUADALUPE DELGADO GOMEZ, NELLY XIMENA PULLUTASIG LLUMITASI, GEOMARA ESTEPHANIA PULLUTASIG LLUMITASI, CARLOS EDUARDO CORNEJO QUEZADA, are a representative sample of the Individual Applicants, who live throughout the United States, although a large contingent live in Los Angeles County.
- 19. Defendant U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") is an agency of the executive branch of the United States government that, among other things, administers and enforces federal immigration laws.
- 20. Defendant USCIS is the component agency within DHS that, among other things, is responsible for the adjudication of applications for advance parole. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (2020).
- 21. This suit is brought against Mr. Mayorkas in his official capacity, as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. He is responsible for the administration and enforcement of these laws, including a duty to control, direct, and supervise all DHS employees and establish implementing regulations. *See* 8

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2. https://www.uscis.gov/i-131

U.S.C. § 1103(a). Mr. Mayorkas is ultimately responsible for the actions of DHS and USCIS.

22. Tracy Renaud is the Acting Director of USCIS, and Felicia Escobar is the Chief of Staff to Director Renaud. This suit is brought against them in their official capacity, as they are responsible for managing the adjudication of the applications for advanced parole.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

- 23. The Individual Applicants herein submitted virtually the same applications for advance parole in August or September 2020 for permission to travel to Mexico and attend the Winter program in Mexico from December 15, 2020 to January 19, 2021, but were forced to postpone their program until this summer due to USCIS's refusal to adjudicate their applications. Proper notices were provided to update the USCIS of the adjustments to the new time period for which the Individual Applicants intend to study abroad. (Ex. E, F))
- 24. Effective December 7, 2020, the USCIS implemented guidelines pursuant to Court order that it was accepting first time requests for DACA, renewal requests, and applications for advance parole based on the terms in effect prior to September 5, 2017.²
- 25. Since submitting the applications for advanced parole Individual Applicants have received no substantive communication from USCIS regarding their applications. The Individual Applicants, and each of them, are prima facie eligible for advance parole, there are no facts that make Plaintiffs' applications complex, and Defendant USCIS has given no indication that it has any reason to deny or delay the adjudication of the Individual Applicants' advance parole

applications. Plaintiff CMSC has inquired about the delay and attempted to ascertain the progress of the applications numerous times without avail. (Ex. D)

26. Defendants have violated their legal obligation to adjudicate Plaintiffs' applications for advance parole within a reasonable timeframe and deprived him of the substantial privileges and benefits that come from obtaining advance permission to travel abroad, in particular attending the course of study offered by CMSC, including having it postponed once already from the Winter 2020 session. Plaintiffs have exhausted all other available avenues of relief and have no other option but to ask this Court, pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 702, 706(1), and the Mandamus and Venue Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, to compel Defendants and those acting under them to take immediate and all appropriate action on Plaintiffs' application for advance parole permitting them to travel abroad.

DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS

- 27. DACA was established in 2012 under President Barack Obama to allow children brought into the United States without proper immigration authorization to defer deportation and who maintain good behavior to receive a work permit to remain in the U.S.; such children were also called "Dreamers" based on the failed DREAM Act.
- 28. On his election, President Donald Trump vowed to end the DACA, and the DHS rescinded the program in September 5, 2017. Numerous lawsuits were filed, including one by the University of California system, which many "Dreamers" attended, asserting that the rescission violated the APA and denied procedural due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The University sought and received an injunction from District Court Judge William Alsup to require DHS to maintain the DACA until the case was decided. DHS challenged this order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which upheld

Judge Alsup's ruling in November 2018, and ordered the DHS to maintain the DACA throughout the U.S. *Regents Univ. California v. D.H.S.*, 908 F.3d 476 (2018).

- 30. Under the Obama administration, the Deferred Action for Children Arrivals (DACA) Program as established and since 2012, DACA recipients were able to apply for Advance Parole travel authorization for educational reasons, to exercise employment opportunities requiring foreign travel, and for humanitarian reasons to be with loved ones suffering from serious illnesses or facing imminent death.
- 31. Consistent with the federal government's having authorized advance parole for DACA recipients who wish to study abroad, in 2014 the CMSC pioneered a study abroad program for DACA recipients. Professor Armando Vazquez-Ramos led 6 groups of Dreamers from January 2015 to August 2017, providing over 160 Dreamers the opportunity to return to their birthplace, reconnect with their family and cultural roots, reaffirm their identity, and develop

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27 28 skills and insights that would assist them serve underprivileged communities in the United States.

- 32. But on September 5, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) suspended the Advance Parole provision for DACA beneficiaries, after the Trump Administration ordered the termination of the DACA program. As a result of this arbitrary and discriminatory administrative practice, DACA beneficiaries were unable to be with their loved ones at critical moments and/or take advantage of important educational and employment opportunities abroad.
- However, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 33. California preliminary injunction filed on January 9, 2018 ruled that the government had the discretion to accept and approve Advance Parole applications from DACA recipients for "deserving cases" per lines 14-16 of page 46. Furthermore, the court ruled that, "nor does this order bar the agency from granting advance parole in individual cases it finds deserving, or from granting deferred action to new individuals on an ad hoc basis". In addition, lines 12-13 of page 47 state, "nothing in this order would bar individuals from asking for such agency relief [advance parole] or bar the agency from granting it in deserving cases". Regents, Case 3:17-cv-05211-WHA, Document 234, Filed 01/09/18.
- Nevertheless, although federal courts in New York, Washington, 34. D.C., and California had enjoined Defendants to continue the DACA program, USCIS continued to refuse to grant DACA recipients Advance Parole.
- Consequently, the CMSC launched in 2018 the National Campaign to 35. Restore DACA's Advance Parole, based upon the principle that the continued denial of Advance Parole travel permits for DACA beneficiaries is causing inhumane and irreparable suffering, and the consequences have been devastating.

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IRREPARABLE INJURY

37. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm because of Defendants' failure to adjudicate the Individual Applicants' advance parole applications, as alleged herein. Defendants have deprived and will continue to deprive Plaintiffs of their right to a timely administrative action. In so doing, Defendants have and are continuing to impair the Individual Applicants' educational progress and prospective employment.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 702, 706(1))

- 38. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations in the paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein.
- 39. The APA requires that government agencies, including Defendants, carry out their duties "within a reasonable time." 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) ("With due regard for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives and within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it."). The APA further provides that an individual adversely affected or aggrieved by agency inaction is entitled to seek judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 702 ("a person suffering legal wrong because of agency action . . . is entitled to judicial review thereof"); 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (defining "agency action" to include "failure

to act"). The reviewing court may "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).

- 40. A Plaintiff adversely affected by agency inaction is entitled to relief under the APA when (1) an agency has a duty to take a discrete agency action and (2) the agency has unreasonably delayed in acting on that duty. *Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All.*, 542 U.S. 55, 63-65 (2004). Here, both elements are satisfied. Defendants have a duty to adjudicate Plaintiff's application for advance parole and have unreasonably delayed in performing this duty.
 - 1. Defendants have a non-discretionary duty to adjudicate Plaintiff's application for advance parole.
- 41. Defendants have a non-discretionary duty to adjudicate Plaintiffs' applications for advance parole without undue delay. Regulations promulgated to implement 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), provide, "When parole is authorized for an alien who will travel to the United States without a visa, the alien *shall be issued an appropriate document authorizing travel.*" 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (2021) (emphasis added).
- 42. Courts have construed such language to support the finding of a non-discretionary duty on the government to act. *See, e.g. Singh v. Still*, 470 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that similar language in the regulations for asylum-based adjustment of status supports a mandatory duty to act on the applications).
- 43. In addition, although whether or not to approve an application for advance parole is in USCIS's discretion, its duty to adjudicate the application is not. *See Khan v. Johnson*, 65 F. Supp. 3d 918, 927 (C.D. Cal. 2014). Therefore, the Court is not barred from compelling the government to act on an application for advance parole granting the DACA recipients permission to travel abroad for educational purposes.

2. Defendants have unreasonably delayed in performing their nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate Plaintiffs' application for advance parole.

- 44. In determining whether an agency unreasonably delayed performing a non-discretionary duty, the Ninth Circuit analyzes the following six factors:
- (1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a "rule of reason"[;] (2) . . . [the] statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason [;] (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake [;] (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority[;] (5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by the delay[;] and (6) the court need not "find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed. *Indep. Mining Co. v. Babbitt*, 105 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting *Telecomms. Rsch. & Action v. F.C.C.*, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
- 45. Defendants have unreasonably delayed adjudicating the Individual Applicants' applications for advance parole. The Individual Applicants applied for advance parole over eight months ago. Their applications complied with all statutory and regulatory requirements for applications for advance parole and included all necessary documentation. If there is anything missing from the application, Defendants have failed to communicate this with Plaintiffs' despite Plaintiffs' consistent efforts to confirm that USCIS needs nothing further to render a final decision on his application.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF Claim for Mandamus Relief 28 U.S.C. § 1361

46. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations in the paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein.

- 47. The Mandamus Act provides district courts the power to "compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the Plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
- 48. A District Court may order mandamus relief when (1) the Plaintiffs have a clear right to the relief sought; (2) the defendant has a duty to do the act in question; and (3) no other adequate remedy is available. *Iddir v. INS*, 301 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 2002); *Patel v. Reno*, 134 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1997). In evaluating a delay in agency action, courts often construe the APA and claims for mandamus relief to be coextensive. *See Indep. Mining Co. v. Babbitt*, 105 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1997); *Abdulmajid v. Arellano*, No. CV 08-796-GHK VBKx, 2008 WL 2625860, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2008).
- 49. Plaintiffs are entitled to mandamus relief for the same reasons that they are entitled to relief under the APA. Plaintiffs can also demonstrate that thy are separately and independently entitled to relief under the Mandamus and Venue Act.
- 50. First, Plaintiffs have a clear right to an adjudication of their application for advanced parole and Defendants have a clear duty to adjudicate Plaintiffs' applications for advance parole. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (2021).
- 51. The Individual Applicants have each paid USCIS \$575 as a mandatory fee for adjudicating their applications for advance parole. USCIS's having demanded and received such fees from the Individual Applicants also places it under an affirmative duty to adjudicate such applications without undue delay. *See Kim v. USCIS*, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1262-63 (D. Colo. 2008) (finding that the agency's imposition of a "considerable mandatory adjudication fee implies that Congress intended that the Attorney General actually decide applications"); *cf. Kaplan v. Chertoff*, 481 F. Supp. 2d 370, 401 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding that FBI has

a nondiscretionary duty to complete background checks necessary for certain immigration benefits based upon the fees it collects to perform such checks).

- 52. Plaintiffs do not have any other adequate remedies because they have exhausted all available administrative remedies. Plaintiffs have submitted multiple services requests and other inquiries to the USCIS (See Exhibits D through F), in an attempt to determine the progress of their application for advance parole and to confirm whether other information that USCIS needs to finalize the adjudication of the application. This has not progressed Plaintiffs' applications and their applications remain pending.
- 53. The unreasonable delay is without justification and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361, this Court should compel Defendants to take immediate action to promptly process and adjudicate Plaintiffs' applications for advance parole granting the DACA recipients permission to travel abroad.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court:

- 1. Declare that Defendants' delay in adjudicating the Individual Applicants applications for advance parole violate the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Administrative Procedure Act;
- 2. Enjoin Defendants to adjudicate the Individual Applicants' Applications for Advance Parole without further delay;
- 3. Retain jurisdiction during the adjudication of the I-131 Applications for Advance Parole in order to ensure compliance with the Court's orders;
- 4. Grant attorney's fees and costs of court to Plaintiffs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412; and

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

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